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Part I 
1. Introduction: three faults 
What Computers Can’t Do is a classic. First published (with the shorter title), in 
1972, it is one of very few works of philosophy that have successfully challenged 
the empirical claims of a modern science. The book made predictions about the 
potential successes and failures of intelligent machines which were thought 
outrageous at the time but which have turned out to be almost exactly correct. 
Perhaps the greatest compliment one can pay the book is to say that the 
predictions seem unremarkable nowadays because they are part of the common- 
sense of ,a large part of the community which thinks about these things. 
What Computers Can’t Do is based on the ideas of the later Wittgenstein and of 
phenomenological philosophy. When I read the book (in 1983), it seemed 
enviably ‘comprehensive and decisive. At the time I was applying Wittgensteinian 
ideas to 1:he analysis of science and Dreyfus seemed to leave little to say on the 
subject of artificial intelligence. Inevitably, the major themes of subsequent 
analyses of machine intelligence, such as those by Winograd and Flores [23], 
Suchman [20], and myself [3], were anticipated by Dreyfus. Even his own more 
recent book about expert systems [9] is unimpressive in comparison. Fortunately 
for later authors, there are some cracks in the argument of What Computers Can’t 
Do. I walnt to show that these cracks are the surface manifestations of deeper 
lying faults that have taken nearly 20 years to become evident. 
I am going to argue that Dreyfus makes a “professional mistake”, a 
“philosophical elision”, and a “sociological error”. The professional mistake is 
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selective application of the philosophical critique. In particular, he does not notice 
that the Wittgensteinian analysis applies just as much to science, technology and 
mathematics as it does to other areas of culture. This allows him to set up a false 
dichotomy between “formal” domains of knowledge where computers can do 
things and “informal” domains where they can’t. I will refer to the spurious 
division between the two as the “knowledge barrier”. The philosophical elision is 
found within the treatment of embodiment. It is a matter of mixing up the 
properties of individuals with the properties of the social groups to which they 
belong. While the physical embodiment of entities may give rise to their collective 
“form of life” (to use a Wittgensteinian phrase which I will explain below), this 
does not mean that every individual that is to share that form of life must have the 
same type of physical body. Immobile cuboid boxes in general may never develop 
human-like ways of being; but this argument is not enough to show that an 
individual immobile cuboid box could not. The elision leads Dreyfus to over- 
emphasise questions to do with the detailed architecture and physical form of 
computers and underemphasise the problem of what it is to be a member of a 
social collectivity. The sociological error is not seeing that many of the apparent 
capabilities of computers are a result of their real-time interactions with their 
users. This means that even if computers are not proper members of social 
collectivities, they can seem to act like humans with the (usually unnoticed) help 
of their users. Often, the results are excellent. Thus, some philosophically and 
psychologically uninteresting computers can do sociologically interesting and 
useful things in unanticipated ways. 
The faults, to extend the earthquake metaphor, have not given rise to damage 
because the book stands on the foundation of its nearly correct predictions about 
what computers would be able to achieve in various domains. The predictions, 
however, have stood the test of time for reasons more complex than Dreyfus 
imagined. This does not diminish the book’s status: almost all the important 
arguments concerning what computers cannot do are there; almost all of them are 
correct if sometimes incorrectly focussed; the arguments are forcefully set out and 
exemplified; and nearly all the head-on rebuttals of the book, encouraged by its 
polemical tone, are just as misdirected as they every were. The mistakes are not 
to do with what computers can’t do, but what they can do and how they do it. 
2. What computers can and can’t do: the professional mistake 
If one examines the book carefully one finds very little about what computers 
can do. The criticisms dominate: so long as computers don’t have bodies they 
won’t be able to do what we do; so long as computers represent the world in 
discrete lumps they won’t be able to respond to the world in our way; we are 
always in a situation, whereas a computer only ‘knows’ its ‘situation’ from a set of 
necessary and sufficient features; we follow rules without being subject to the 
Wittgensteinian regress of rules that are required to explain how rules should be 
applied and further rules to explain how those rules are to be applied and so 
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forth. The trouble is that if you take all of this on board, computers ought not to 
be able tlo do anything. 
So what, according to Dreyfus, can computers do in spite of these disabilities? 
On pages 291-293 we are told some of the answers: they can reproduce 
“elementary associationistic behaviour where meaning and context are irrelevant 
to the activity concerned” (examples include mechanical dictionary translation 
and pattern recognition by template-matching); they can work well in areas that 
involve “the conceptual rather than the perceptual world” . . . [where] . . . 
“problems are completely formalized and completely calculable”. In the Intro- 
duction to the, 1979, second edition of the book there is more: Dreyfus admits his 
earlier neglect of certain programs which “while solving hard technical problems 
and producing programs that compete with human experts, achieve success 
precisely because they are restricted to a narrow domain of facts, and thus 
exemplify what Edward Feigenbaum, the head of the DENDRAL project, has 
called ‘knowledge engineering’.” 
The odd thing about all of this is that Dreyfus, as a follower of Wittgenstein, 
ought not to think of the conceptual world as much different from the perceptual 
world. The conceptual world too is “situated”. The later philosophy of Wittgens- 
tein shows that what we take as logically and scientifically compelling is what we 
do not know how to doubt [l, 21,221. What we take as certain is what follows for 
us, as a matter of course, in the way we live in the world. In the last resort there is 
no more compelling proof. Even logical syllogisms cannot be proved if we are 
unwilling just to “see” and act as though they follow in the situations in which we 
find ourselves. Thinking and acting in the world are but two sides of the same 
coin. 
The te:rm that is used to describe the combinations of thinking and acting which 
constitute our experience is “form-of-life”. One way to approach this difficult idea 
is to start from discussions of science. Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms” can be 
thought of as Wittgensteinian forms of life within the culture of science (though 
Kuhn himself did not make anything of the parallel). A paradigm gives us our 
ways of thinking and acting scientifically; it is a whole scientific way of being [13]. 
Thus witlhin one paradigm something may be absolutely fixed while in another it is 
not (e.g., mass is fixed for Newton but not for Einstein). Likewise, what may 
count as a scientific finding is determined by the “conceptual structure” associated 
with what counts as doing a proper piece of scientific work (e.g. any experiment 
that did not conserve mass would, by that fact, be flawed under the Newtonian 
paradigm but this is no longer the case under relativity). There is no way of 
proving isomething either conceptual or experimental outside of the frame of a 
paradigm/form of life. The later philosophy of Wittgenstein makes the world of 
ideas a subject for sociological study while making the social world a subject for 
conceptual analysis. 
In reclent years the Wittgensteinian starting point has been used in detailed 
analyses of mathematics, science and technology, showing us how to see them as 
just as much social phenomena as, say, natural language. To give some idea of 
how this can be we may think about the process of replicating an experimental 
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claim to find out if it is true. As everyone knows who has ever done a practical 
class, experiments are hard and they usually don’t work first time if they work at 
all. In the normal way this presents no problem because we know roughly what 
the result of an experiment should look like and we carry on until we get it right. 
A problem arises, however, when the correct outcome of an experiment is in 
dispute, as is typical in frontier areas of science. In these areas the skill-laden 
nature of experimentation becomes much more obvious. Typically scientists 
whose findings are disputed claim that their rivals did not do the experiments 
carefully enough and that is why they cannot find the phenomenon. The rivals will 
claim that there is no phenomenon and the original experiments were done in a 
sloppy fashion. There is no way to settle such a dispute with further experiments 
alone for each experiment may or may not have been done sufficiently well and 
there is no direct way of measuring experimental skill. The usual surrogate 
measure-Does the experiment produce a result in the right range?-is not 
available. In sum, we get the “experimenter’s regress”: to know whether “x” 
exists one needs to build a good “x-detector”, but to know whether you have 
built a good x-detector you have to see whether it does what it is supposed to do, 
but to know what it is supposed to do you have to know whether or not it ought 
to detect x when it is working properly, but to know whether it ought to detect x 
when it is working properly you need to know whether x exists, but to know 
whether x exists you need to build a good x-detector, and so forth 121. The skillful 
nature of experimentation and the workings out of the experimenter’s regress 
have been shown in, among other things, case studies of laser building, the 
detection of gravitational radiation, and experiments in parapsychology [2]. 
The phenomenon applies just as much in the case of famous scientific 
experiments though this is surprisingly little known. For example, the lay history 
of physics recounts that, say, Einstein’s (1905) special theory of relativity was 
proved to be correct because the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 showed 
clearly that the speed of light was constant in all directions. What is not widely 
known is that Michelson himself was never satisfied with the results of his 
experiment, that according to the protocol that he and his collaborators set out, 
the experiment was never done properly, and that as late as 1925, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science awarded its prize to one of 
Michelson’s erstwhile colleagues-Dayton Miller-for an improved experiment 
showing that the speed of light varied by 10 km per second according to the 
direction of measurement in relation to the orbit of the Earth. A very similar 
story can be told about Eddington’s 1919 solar eclipse observations, which are 
widely taken to prove the general theory. Most other “decisive” passages of 
scientific, technological and mathematical history turn out to have looked far less 
clear cut at the time and place they were done [7]. They look certain only at a 
distance. All this means that the outcome of a passage of scientific work is very 
much more like a matter of social agreement about what it is proper to believe 
than the application of an experimental or theoretical algorithm. It is, then, 
unsurprising that what count as scientific laws seems to vary in different historical 
and social circumstances. 
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Given this, the computer modelling of science, as well as the achievements of 
DENDRAL, MYCIN and the other products of “knowledge engineering” ought 
to be just as puzzling to a Wittgensteinian as natural language translation, for all 
are matters of understanding the subtleties of social situations. Where Dreyfus 
says (pp. 200-201) “When one uses the laws of physics to guide missiles, for 
example, ,the present performance of the missile is an instantiation of timeless, 
universal laws which make no reference to the situation except in terms of such 
laws.” he is misunderstanding the nature of scientific laws and expecting far too 
much of missiles. Missile guidance is not a matter of timeless laws but of the 
application of technological skill, and the extent to which missiles are accurate is a 
matter of the extent to which designers, builders and operators are skilled in their 
respective crafts [16]. But even what counts as a proper measure of accuracy, 
what counts as a proper determination within an agreed measure and what counts 
as a piece of data are matters of social agreement. In recent times this was made 
graphically evident by the argument over the performance of “Patriot” during the 
Gulf War [18,19]. Physical laws are just the last things we agree to hold constant 
while we argue about everything else. In serious disputes, even these are given up 
[2]. Though we usually think of them as universal, the perceived scope of physical 
laws is a matter of how well our scientific form of life is going at the time. 
Dreyfus, in spite of his philosophical roots, seems to have invested too deeply in a 
pre-Wittgensteinian, steady state, view of science which allows him to think of the 
language of scientific laws as outside of social life in a way that, say, natural 
language is not. This leads him to give too much credence to the power of 
computers, in those areas which he allows himself to think of as “formal”. This is 
his “professional” mistake [4,8]. 
3. The problem of embodiment: the philosophical elision 
All three of the deep faults in What Computers Can’t Do come back in one way 
or another to neglect of the social embeddedness of both humans and computers. 
One of the clearest manifestations is to be found in Dreyfus’ analysis of the 
problem of embodiment. Here we find the philosophical elision: mixing up the 
properties of individuals and social collectivities. 
Dreyfm, once more following Wittgenstein, shows that the way our bodies fit 
into the world makes the world available to us. For example, this is what he has 
to say about the problem of recognizing chairs: 
What makes an object a chair is its function, and what makes possible its role 
as equipment for sitting is its place in a total practical context. This 
presupposes certain facts about human beings (fatigue, the way the body 
bends), and a network of other culturally determined equipment (tables, 
floors’, lamps), and skills (eating, writing, going to conferences, giving 
lectures, etc.). (p. 237) 
He goes on to say: 
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Since it turns out that pattern recognition is a bodily skill basic to all 
intelligent behavior, the question of whether artificial intelligence is possible 
boils down to the question of whether there can be an artificial embodied 
agent. (p. 250) 
In this, 1972, treatment, the idea of embodiment is very much tied up with the 
physical constitution of the body and its interactions with the familiar furniture of 
the world. In the 1992 edition, Dreyfus seems to have changed his view, 
embodiment becoming a more conceptual notion. On pages xx to xxi of the 
Introduction to the 1992 edition Lenat is quoted, putting an argument against 
Dreyfus’ earlier view: Wheelchair-bound “Madeleine”, it seems, was blind from 
birth, could not use her hands to read braille, and yet acquired commonsense 
knowledge from books that were read to her. Lenat argues that this shows that 
the body is not as important to pattern recognition as Dreyfus claimed. Dreyfus’ 
counter-argument is that Madeleine has a body with an inside and an outside, 
which can be moved around and, in addition, Madeleine has imagination; she can 
empathise with those who have more complete bodies. But under this argument a 
body is not so much a physical thing as a conceptual structure. If you can have a 
body as unlike the norm and as unable to use tools, chairs, blind persons’ canes 
and so forth as Madeleine’s, yet you can still gain commonsense knowledge, then 
something like today’s computers-fixed metal boxes-might also acquire com- 
monsense given the right programming. It is no longer necessary for machines to 
move around in the world like robots in order to be aware of their situation and 
exhibit “intelligence”. 
The resolution of the argument between Lenat and Dreyfus is to be gained, 
once more, by seeing how ideas are embedded in the social world. Wittgenstein 
said that if a lion could speak we would not understand it. The reason we would 
not understand it is that the world of a talking lion-its “form of life”-would be 
different from ours. Bringing back Dreyfus’ chair example, lions would not have 
chairs in their language in the way we do because lions’ knees do not bend as ours 
do, nor do lions “write, go to conferences or give lectures”. Circus lions talking 
among themselves would, presumably, group what we call a household chair 
along with the other weapons they encounter in the hands of “lion tamers”, not 
with objects to do with relaxation. They would not distinguish between sticks and 
chairs and this is why their language would be incomprehensible to us. But this 
does not mean that every entity that can recognise a chair has to be able to sit on 
one. That confuses the capabilities of an individual with the form of life of the 
social group in which that individual is embedded. Entities that can recognise 
chairs have only CO share the form of life of those who can sit down. We would not 
understand what a talking lion said to us, not because it had a lion-like body, but 
because the large majority of its friends and acquaintances had lion-like bodies 
and lion-like interests. In principle, if one could find a lion cub that had the 
potential to have conversions, one could bring it up in human society to speak 
about chairs as we do in spite of its funny legs. It would learn to recognise chairs 
as it learned to speak OUT language. This is how the Madeleine case is to be 
understood; Madeleine has undergone linguistic socialization. 
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In sum, the shape of the bodies of the members of a social collectivity and the 
situations in which they find themselves give rise to their form of life. Collec- 
tivities whose members have different bodies and encounter different situations 
develop different forms of life. But given the capacity for linguistic socialisation, 
an individual can come to share a form of life without having a body or the 
experience of physical situations which correspond to that form of life. What we 
don’t know is how to make something with the capacity to be socialized in this 
way. 
What we do know is the following: First, dogs, say, do not have the capacity to 
be sufficiently linguistically socialised to pass even the simplest Turing test in spite 
of their ability to move around in our world encountering and coping with the 
same physical environment, and in spite of the fact that their brains are much 
more like our brains than they are like computers, and in spite of the fact that 
they can be trained to do highly complex specifiable tasks. A dog does not have 
the capacity of the hypothetical ion with conversational potential discussed in the 
last paragraph. And this is a matter of conceptual mismatch not just vocalisation. 
For examlple, dogs can’t be trained to tidy up a house even though they would be 
physically capable of doing so and the rewards for successful trainers (and their 
dogs), would be great. The problem is that the concept of an acceptably and 
appropriately “tidy” room is bound to social context: it is different for a student 
and a diplomat; Sunday morning is not the same as Saturday evening; today’s 
newspaper is not the same as yesterday’s newspaper while even yesterday’s 
newspaper can gain value in the hands of an artist or an antique dealer. To 
understand “tidy” one has to understand all this and much more. 
Second., such evidence as we have from those who have been isolated from 
normal human society suggests that even persons who are the same as us in terms 
of brain and bodily structure may not have the capacity to be socialised if the 
socialisation does not start early enough in their lives. We know, then, that 
immersion in human-like physical and social situations is not suficient to produce 
socialisation even where the brain and body are like or even identical to those of 
humans. 
Third, humans, such as Madeleine, whose bodies are very different from the 
norm and who cannot move around in the way that dogs and inadequately 
socialised humans can, do have the capacity to be linguistically socialised and 
come to share our conceptual structure and way of seeing the world. Madeleine 
would know the difference between a tidy and an untidy room even though she 
could not tidy it up. We know, then, that human-like bodies are not necessary for 
human-like socialisation. 
Putting all this together, we can say with confidence that if we can’t train a 
computer without a body to act like a socialised human, giving it the ability to 
move around in the world encountering the same physical situations is not going 
to solve the problem. On the other hand, if we can find out what is involved in the 
sort of socialising process undergone by a Madeleine-let us call it “socialisabili- 
ty”-we may be able to apply it to an immobile box. 
The question that remains is whether socialisability and immersion in a human 
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form of life, even where this consists solely of encounters with linguistic 
situations, is necessary to create a shared conceptual structure or whether such a 
structure can be engineered some other way. Computer optimists might point out 
that a few silicon chips with no social experience whatsoever can be programmed 
with what can sometimes pass for linguistic competence. Is there hope, then, for 
steady incremental progress toward social competence without socialisation? In 
spite of the small successes, and in spite of the philosophical elisions, I believe 
Dreyfus is right to dismiss these hopes. The commonsense knowledge we need for 
full language use is not the sort of collection of facts and rules that, say, Lenat is 
assembling with his Cyc project; rather, it does have to do with being a member 
of the relevant social collectivity [15]. The linguistic capacity of computers-even, 
I predict, those which take advantage of the products of the Cyc project-is not 
nor will be equivalent to linguistic socialisation. Many of Dreyfus’ arguments (like 
my “tidiness’ example and the studies of science referred to in the previous 
section), show why this is so. At the end of this review I will suggest a simple way 
of revealing the difference between the minimal linguistic competence currently 
and foreseeably attainable by computers and proper linguistic socialization. 
It is worth noting, finally, that the Dreyfusian embodiment critique still applies 
where claims are made on behalf of collections of computers. There are those 
who say in response to the criticism that computers aren’t social or socialisable, “I 
have a whole network of interlinked computers!” Others are trying to model 
society by programming the interaction of “actors” using quasi-economic reason- 
ing. These ideas are misplaced for reasons which might have been perfectly 
expressed by Dreyfus if the elision between the embedded and embodied 
individual had been resolved. I would rewrite his passage on page 250 as follows: 
“Since it turns out that pattern recognition is a bodily skill basic to all intelligent 
behavior, the equation of whether an artificial society like ours is possible boils 
down to the question of whether there can be artificially embodied agents like 
us.” What the project of AI still lacks is a computer or a network of computers, 
embodied or unembodied, that has been or could be socialized into our form of 
life, linguistically or otherwise. Incidentally, the same applied to ants and bees, 
those most “social” of creatures. 
4. Repairs, domains and micro-worlds: the sociological error 
While Dreyfus’ treatment of the nature of science exhibits a professional 
mistake and his treatment of embodiment contains a philosophical elision, the 
overall treatment of the abilities of computers reveals a sociological error. He 
does not see or draw the appropriate conclusions from the fact that much of the 
ability of computers lies not inside the case but in the way we interact with them 
when we use them; we continually “repair” the deficiencies of computers (and 
animals and other humans). A good way of getting hold of this is to think about 
Weizenbaum’s famous ELIZA in its DOCTOR instantiation. DOCTOR, as a 
computer program, or “electronic brain”, is a toy, yet as a psychotherapist it is 
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good enough to have given rise to arguments about its ability to replace humans. 
Simply to make the obvious response about the nature of psychotherapy is to miss 
the point; the point is that if the user is putting enough into the social interaction, 
the computer does not have to do very much. In the case of DOCTOR, the 
patient does most of the work. The locus clussiczu for this argument is Garfinkel’s 
“counsellor” experiment, in which students imputed counselling skills to a list of 
“yes-no” responses driven by a table of random numbers [ll]. This is also what 
makes it possible for “con men” to operate; they make sure that the “mark” 
wants to b’elieve the stories they tell [17]. 
One can see how this works in the context of computers by choosing a very 
simple but very familiar example, a pocket calculator. We think of pocket 
calculators as doing arithmetic better than we do, but in some respects they do 
not. When you use a pocket calculator you have to prepare the world for it: you 
have to work out in what order to insert the symbols, depending on what type of 
calculator you have, (try “12x - 4”); you have to work out what the symbols 
mean (was the “x” in the last sum an algebraic symbol or the multiplication 
symbol); you have to “repair” the calculator’s mistakes (try 7/11 x 11 on your 
cheap pocket calculator or on your powerful mainframe working at maximum 
precision); you have to approximate appropriately on behalf of the calculator- 
approximation being the basis of nearly all science and much arithmetic [14]; you 
have to read the keys and the display, know how to know that you have made a 
keying error, and know how to know when the sum is wrong and, of course, 
before you can start, you have to know how to put your question into arithmetical 
form [3]. Only a little bit of work is done by the calculator. All this is what we 
ought to expect for, if we apply the ideas of Wittgenstein assiduously, it is 
puzzling that a calculator-obviously an unsocialized entity-can do anything at 
all of the social practice of arithmetic. 
There are, contrary to Dreyfus, no “domains” in which computers work. They 
work a bit in all domains and they don’t work entirely in any domain. The only 
place wherle computers work without any repairs is in “micro-worlds”, but these 
are not the same as domains. 
From page 4 onward in the Introduction to the 1979 edition, Dreyfus provides a 
superb critique of micro-worlds (a critique later accepted by Winograd). It is 
summed up on pages 13 and 14: 
. . . one cannot equate as [Winograd] does, a program which deals with “a 
tiny b’it of the world,” with a program which deals with a “mini- 
world.” . . . sub-worlds are not related like isolable physical systems to larger 
systems they compose; rather they are local elaborations of a while which 
they presuppose. (Dreyfus’ stress). 
In other words, so called micro-worlds are not like little bits of the real world, 
because every little bit of the real world has roots in the world as a whole. This, 
once more, is the problem of commonsense knowledge. SHRDLU deals with 
blocks, but if I ask SHRDLU to put the sugar-lump-shaped, sky-coloured block 
on top of the Toblerone shaped block which is the color of that stuff you get in 
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the corner of your eyes when you wake up after a heavy night, it will have to 
know more than is likely to be in its micro-world at the time of asking. 
Nevertheless, the question still belongs to the domain of blocks. A great deal of 
discussion of expert systems in particular and the capability of computers in 
general runs into trouble because domain-specificity is confused with restriction of 
operations to a micro-world. And, sometimes, Dreyfus himself mixes them up. 
The worlds of the conceptual, of spectrum analysis and of science in general are 
not micro-worlds, they are domains, and they have their foundations in common 
sense. Turning back to arithmetic for a final illustration: Try “VIII times VII?“. 
What is the answer? It is “56” or is it “LVI” or ‘V*I*I*I”. The solution is not to 
be found in any arithmetical micro-world, though it clearly belongs to the domain 
of arithmetic. 
5. Mhneomorphic actions 
So, what calz computers do ? The question is difficult for philosophically- 
inclined sociologists or sociologically-inclined philosophers. When they learn to 
become Wittgensteinians (or ethnomethodologists or, perhaps, Heideggerians), 
they learn to take anything and everything that people think is universal, 
straightforwardly rule following, or otherwise simple for humans to accomplish, 
and show how in reality it is local and situated, always requires an infinite regress 
of rules to explicate fully, and depends therefore on full socialization into a form 
of life to accomplish. Is there anything that humans do that is not like this? 
Let us make a fresh start: “Can machines mimic humans?” The answer is 
"yes"--' lust to the extent that humans can mimic machines. And what is it to 
mimic a machine? The key, once more, is to be found in Dreyfus-though he 
makes little of it. On page 291 he says: “Area I [the first of Dreyfus’ four “areas 
of knowledge”, which I will discuss below] is where the S-R [stimulus-response] 
psychologists are most at home.” In our (social scientists’ and socially minded 
philosophers’), rush to show that everything is situated, socialized, and otherwise 
complicated, we have forgotten that humans can act in another way-a way that 
can be modelled with a micro-world and taught after the fashion of the 
Skinnerians. I refer to this way of acting as mimeomorphic action. (In earlier 
work I called it “behavior-specific action” [3].) 
Let us define an “action” as the sort of thing that I might normally do in some 
society or another, such as catch a train, score a goal, write a cheque, write a love 
letter, wink (not blink), greet someone, or wave to someone (actions can be 
embedded within one another). Let us define a behavior as the bodily movements 
I use in order to instantiate that action on some particular occasion. Then, put 
simply, an ordinary action is characterised by the fact that the same action can be 
instantiated by many different behaviors. For example, paying money can be done 
by passing metal or paper tokens, writing a cheque, offering a plastic card and 
signing it, and so forth, and each of these can be executed in many different ways 
in terms of the space-time co-ordinate description of my bodily movements. At 
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the same time, the same piece of behavior may be the instantiation of many 
different actions. For example, signing one’s name, with identical hand move- 
ments on each occasion, might be the action of paying money, or it might be 
agreeing to a divorce, the final flourish of a suicide note, or a making a specimen 
signature for the bank. There is, then, no straightforward mapping between 
actions and behaviors. One might train a person, or a pigeon to behave in a 
certain way, but that would not be the same as training them to act in a certain 
way. 
Most of the time most of our actions are like this and that is what makes social 
science and the mechanical reproduction of actions so difficult. When we observe 
behaviors we do not, thereby, understand actions, and when we reproduce 
behaviors, we do not, thereby, reproduce actions; yet it is the orderliness of 
actions not behaviors that makes the world we experience. This is another way of 
expressing the Wittgensteinian point common to all the philosophical critiques of 
AI to which I have referred. 
This description, however, leaves space for a special class of actions. In 
“mimeomorphic actions” we do attempt to maintain a one-to-one mapping 
between our actions and observable behaviors. The meaning of certain actions is 
bound up with their being mimeomorphic (e.g. marching), whereas in others the 
opposite is the case-they are essentially “polimorphic” (e.g. writing love letters), 
but many types of action can be executed in either way depending on intention, 
desired outcome and what seems appropriate in the context. The term 
“mimeomorphic” refers to the possibility of reproducing such actions by copying 
previous occurrences; “polimorphic” actions take many shapes (poly) but to get 
the shape right needs reference to the society--p&. (In earlier work I called 
polimorphic actions “regular actions” [3].) 
There is a complication. Since there are always parameters within which every 
behavior is different from those which preceded it (e.g. the time of day is 
different, the Sun might be shining on one occasion and not on another, and so 
forth), and since the level of accuracy of the space-time description of any 
movement can be increased almost indefinitely, there is always variation of 
behavior within some frame of reference however hard we are trying to eliminate 
it. Thus, by “the same behavior” we have to mean the same behavior within the 
outer edges of our indifference. In terms of intention, this may be marked either 
by our preference for a mimeomorphic action to be carried out in the same way 
each time so far as we can manage and detect, or our readiness for it to be carried 
out with an arbitrary degree of behavioral similarity so long as the variation 
remains within acceptable bounds [6]. The notion of mimeomorphic action, then, 
allows actions to be unambiguously mapped onto behavior even when there is a 
degree of variation in the behavior. 
In a “digitised” system classes are kept separate because we are tolerant to a 
degree of variation. To use Haugeland’s example, a dollar coin is still worth a 
dollar even if it is worn or clipped (compare this to a gold bar, which changes 
value with every change in substance) [3,12]. One might say, then, that in 
mimeomorphic actions, action and the corresponding behavior are digitised. 
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One finds mimeomorphic actions in areas as varied as work on Taylorist 
production lines, the golf swing, high-board competition diving, ideal bureauc- 
racies and Sollte arithmetical operations. 
Thus, there are areas of human life where behavior can be substituted for 
action, where humans could be trained to accomplish satisfactory outcomes in the 
way that pigeons are trained, and where machines that exhibit the appropriate 
behavior can stand in for human counterparts. In human life there are no domains 
that are wholly like this, but many where we strive to make them thus. Initial 
military training is perhaps the best developed large-scale version but the 
phenomenon is found on a small scale within many domains. It is in these bits of 
domains where computers and other machines can directly replace human action; 
for here humans are trying to make the aggregate of their own actions into 
micro-worlds [3]. Since this is difficult, a computerised replacement will often 
represent an improvement. (Because the boundaries of the micro-world-like bits 
rarely correspond to the boundaries of the complete role of any human, 
replacement of whole humans by machines-without reorganizing everything 
else-is rarely successful.) 
To summarise, many domains contain micro-world-like elements, that is, little 
areas where people are doing their best to accomplish mimeomorphic actions 
some of the time. Where they succeed, they have built the human version of a 
micro-world. Many institutions that are taken to be micro-world-like, such as 
ordinary bureaucracies, ordinary production lines, most of the military, and 
nearly all of science, are not micro-worlds at all. But all of these institutions 
contain bits and pieces that are micro-worlds-in those little areas, computers fit 
naturally. 
6. The story so far 
Dreyfus’ position is built on deep faults. His predictions are correct for reasons 
that are far more complicated than he supposes. His professional mistake and his 
sociological error combine to lead him to be too generous about the capabilities of 
computers in narrow domains and too pessimistic about computers’ abilities in 
wider domains. To explain the difference between successful and unsuccessful 
computers he invokes the idea of “formal” and “informal” domains of knowl- 
edge, an idea which is incompatible with his general philosophy. 
The alternative that I am putting forward here has three parts. First, computers 
can do anything where the user supplies most of what needs to be done in the way 
of expertise. Second, “repairs’‘-by which is meant the “filling in” of gaps and 
misunderstandings in computers’ performance- are readily available and largely 
invisible if the required expertise is ubiquitous or already familiar to the users of 
the machine. (That is, if it is what already counts as commonsense among those in 
the domain.) Third, computers can reproduce what humans do in those areas 
where we prefer to act in a mimeomorphic way. (Chunks of arithmetic are like 
this and so are small bits of many domains.) How successful computers are in this 
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capacity is a matter partly of computer design and partly of history. We change 
the way we prefer to exercise our skills as history unfolds. If George Orwell’s 
1984 had come true, and we all spoke a simplified “Newspeak”, we might now 
have successful speech transcribers. This model of what computers can do is much 
more complicated than that of Dreyfus. I now have to explain how it is that his 
predictions are so nearly right while his explanation of what computers can do is 
so over-simplified. 
On page 293, Dreyfus offers predictions of computer success and failure in 
terms of four “Areas”. Area I is called “Associationistic” and includes such 
things as .word-for-word translation. Area II, “Simple Formal”, includes comput- 
able games such as tic-tat-toe and theorem proving. In the terminology of this 
text, it includes the domain of the “conceptual”. Presumably it also includes 
missile guidance and those bits of science that, according to the 1979 Intro- 
duction, a:re within the purview of knowledge engineering. The paradigm Area III 
task is chess. Area III is “Complex-Formal” and includes games that are 
computable in principle but not in practice. Area IV, “Nonformal”, includes 
normal language translation and all the rest of our activities that are context- and 
situation-dependent. 
A crucial part of Dreyfus’ position is that Area IV is qualitatively different from 
the other three; this is the area that is beyond computerisation for fundamental 
reasons. Area IV lies beyond his knowledge barrier. For Dreyfus, no digital 
computer will ever accomplish Area IV tasks; this is an in-principle argument. 
(Though there is some ambivalence about the nature and potential of neural 
nets-see below .) 
I am going to argue, on the other hand, that there is no knowledge barrier, and 
that there is continuity between all four areas. According to my view, the areas 
vary only in the ratio of the types of actions we find in them and how these types 
of actions relate to what is already familiar to us. The discontinuity in my theory 
is between ordinary and mimeomorphic actions. In my theory no computer that 
has not been socialised will be able to perform polimorphic actions and no 
computer that is based on existing designs can be socialised. But elements of both 
types of action are to be found in each of Dreyfus’ four areas (in different and 
changing proportions), while repairs enable some performances without the 
benefit of socialisation to pass as competent. 
In discussing the four areas in detail I’ll dispose of Area III first since, though it 
has been the subject of most heat, the debate bears on almost nothing of 
philosophical importance. 
Dreyfus is said to have been proved wrong by the progress of chess-playing 
programs and this accounts for the heat of debate in Area III. Yet the job of a 
chess computer is to beat a human at chess irrespective of method; this need have 
nothing to do with mimicking human abilities; it does seem that recent successes 
have come through brute strength methods. Compare this with, say, language. A 
successful anguage using computer is not supposed to beat a human at language; 
the whole idea is incoherent. If language-using computers were to win in Turing 
test competitions they would win not by beating humans at language but by being 
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indistinguishable from humans. The success of chess computers tells us no more 
about artificial (human-type) intelligence than the success of tractors at tug-of-war 
tells us about muscles. 
Turning back to the other areas we can see how in every case both kinds of 
actions are involved in the associated domains. As far as Area I is concerned, the 
treatments of both Dreyfus and myself agree that associationistic, stimulus- 
response type tasks can be managed by computers. But I say this can happen only 
after the stimuli have been digitised 13,121. Consider word-for-word translation. I 
have just yelled to my general-purpose daughter “Hey-Lil, wosthe- 
frarnsezfercow” (she replied, “vash”). At the very least, for even a translation- 
dedicated, speech-recognising computer I would have to enunciate my words 
separately and clearly and say “French” not “frarnsez”. The computer and I 
would be fitting my question into a set of unambiguous templates. (I am arguing 
that barring socialisation of the computer I will always have to do the larger part 
of this job.) Once something has been digitised it becomes amenable to 
mimeomorphic action and can be thought about in terms of stimulus-response. 
(If we go back to human and animal psychology, the same applies. Stimulus- 
response only works when the organism responds unambiguously to classes of 
positive and aversive stimuli. We and the organism together do the digitising.) 
Area II actions, as explained above, are not as “formal” as Dreyfus takes them 
to be. The interesting thing about much of Area II is that the digitisation of inputs 
and repairs of outputs that we do is invisible. To coin a phrase that will be 
familiar to English readers, in Area II we do “invisible mending”; invisible 
mending is mistaken for no mending at all. Thus, think of how many different 
ways there are of playing tic-tat-toe in real life: with paper and pencil, with 
blackboard and chalk, with sand and sea shells. . . . Each of these depends on our 
willingness to repair the variations and see the playing arena as a set of symbols; 
that is how we and our opponent can agree about what we are doing. Playing 
tic-tat-toe with a computer requires that we present it with an unambiguous input 
and translate it’s output into the familiar game in something of the same way. 
When we turn to science the matter is even more revealing. We are used to 
making the untidy world of science and technology fit our dreams of what science 
and technology ought to look like. We describe it as though it were all exact and 
logical and we maintain this model by continual retrospective re-accounting, 
blaming all mismatches between dream and reality on human error or villainy 
[2,7]. To fit a computer into an Area II network of human actors is no more 
difficult than fitting a slide-rule, a set of log tables, or the activities of scientists 
and engineers when seen from a distance. We have been doing all this for so long 
that it comes quite naturally and we never notice it is we who are making the 
pieces fit. 
Area IV is much the same except that to make computers work we would have 
to do much more digitisation and repair. For example, in the case of natural 
language interactions with computers we would have to learn to make our speech 
mimeomorphic, and that would mean restructuring our lives. We are unwilling to 
do this kind of thing and that means computers don’t work in the corresponding 
roles. 
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That is how the two treatments-the Dreyfus, formal-informal dichotomy 
scheme, and the dichotomy of actions scheme+ome so close to coinciding in 
terms of their predictions. Nevertheless, under my treatment there are elements 
of Area IV tasks that can be done by computers and these might grow or diminish 
as we change our view of how certain tasks ought to be done. What is more, 
computers will “work” better at Area IV tasks if we are ready to accept ramified 
behaviors as equivalent to actions; this is a matter of how vigilant or charitable we 
are ready to be in respect of computers in our midst. If we are very charitable, 
and ready to do more and more repair work, we may think of computers as 
accomplishing Area IV tasks. DOCTOR is very cleverly designed to encourage us 
to accept it in this way. As far as some people are concerned, DOCTOR does 
passable psychotherapy, and that is certainly an Area IV task. 
To conclude, we can see how it is that Dreyfus’ predictions are right-or nearly 
right-in spite of the over-simplification. It is just that in Areas I and II we do not 
notice how much work we do in embedding computers in our society, whereas in 
Area IV we are generally unwilling to do the work. For Dreyfus, the combination 
of professi’onal and sociological errors leads him to think there is a knowledge 
barrier between domains in which computers can work and those in which they 
can’t, but the areas are not discontinuous-the extent to which computers work 
within them is a matter of the way we act, not the intrinsic nature of domains. 
This means that Dreyfus does not allow enough scope for computers to creep 
across the knowledge barrier as clever designers find different ways of substituting 
for polimorphic actions, as they approximate polimorphic actions with ramified 
behaviors so that irritating breakdowns become rarer, as they learn to leave it to 
the user to cope with the inevitable breakdowns, as they find ingenious ways of 
mechanising more of the little bits and pieces of mimeomorphic action which fill 
domains lilke currants in a bun, as they encourage us to be more charitable to 
their creations, and as they persuade us to do things in different ways so that we 
can avail ourselves of the economic efficiency of machines. 
Part II 
7. Individuals and the problem of neural nets 
The innovation in the 1992 edition of What Computers “Still” Can’t Do is the 
introductory chapter, its second half being about neural nets. Dreyfus appears to 
have a schizophrenic relationship with neural nets. At the end of the new chapter 
he returns to the position set out in an earlier article [lo]. The crucial insight of 
the earlier paper is that neural nets learn through stimulus-response [S-R] type 
training and that this is not equivalent to socialisation. Even the best neural net 
we have-the embodied human brain-cannot learn human-type situated re- 
sponses, pattern recognition, and so forth through S-R training and therefore we 
should not expect it from neural nets. This position is summed up in the very last 
sentence of the new Introduction: “. . . as improbably as it was that one could 
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build a device that could capture our humanity in a physical symbol system, it 
seems at least as unlikely that one could build a device sufficiently like us to act 
and learn in the world.” Actually, most of the preceding discussion in that chapter 
is about artificial creatures finding their way about in a physical universe and as 
was explained above in the section on embodiment, this exhibits the philosophical 
elision. If, however, we take it that succeeding at “acting and learning in the 
world” could be achieved by learning our language in a “Madeleine-like” way, 
then Dreyfus can be taken to be talking about the problem of linguistic 
socialisation. 
So far so good, but here and elsewhere Dreyfus recommends neural nets as an 
improvement on “Good Old Fashioned AI” (GOFAI), because they do not have 
to represent the world before they can manipulate it and, what may amount to the 
same thing, because they do not have to be programmed explicitly with rules. 
There is something wrong with this argument. There are previous generations of 
intelligent machines that do not have to be programmed with explicit rules, for 
example rule-inducing expert systems, or record-and-playback robots, that we do 
not count as breakthroughs in artificial intelligence [3]. Dreyfus does not make 
clear what is the qualitative difference between these and neural nets. 
There is an old saying “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. It is almost as though 
Dreyfus is so concerned with killing GOFAI once and for all that he is ready to 
embrace GOFAI’s enemy, neural nets, in spite of his more general arguments! 
I believe, however, that his defence of neural nets is better understood as, 
again, a consequence of the philosophical elision. If, like Dreyfus, one thinks of 
the problem of embodiment as being primarily about physical form rather than 
embedding into a form of life, then the key becomes the architecture of individual 
devices. For this half of the schizophrenic Dreyfus each new way of making a 
computer is a new challenge. Digital computers are one thing, analogue com- 
puters are another, robots are another, and neural nets are something else again. 
To see the sort of trouble that this can cause one has only to note that most neural 
net computers are instantiated on digital machines so that it is far from clear what 
they are in physical terms. (I have had the benefit of reading a revealing email 
interchange between Dreyfus and Judea Pearl on this matter.) This side of 
Dreyfus is continually drawn to considering the architecture of computers and 
how this might compare with the architecture of the brain. In neural net 
modellers he seems to find an ally for the unsatisfying models of skill acquisition 
and the location of knowledge put forward in the book jointly written with his 
brother [9]. As far as I can see, Dreyfus’ philosophical position need not lead in 
this direction. Of course, an author may go where his interests take him, but I 
think I now see why Dreyfus’ essays into the architecture of computers, computer 
programs, and the brain are so much less convincing than his brilliant insights into 
our way of being in the world and their consequences for the project of AI. 
Different types of computer are better at one thing or another, but this is not a 
fundamental matter. What is fundamental is the method of embedding in society. 
Neural nets are undisputably better at some “intelligent” tasks than other 
approaches. But perhaps this is because they are easier to “program” with a great 
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deal of complex information-after all, they “grow” their programs after hours 
and hours of fast, automated iterative development without humans having to 
think through every inferential step. Looked at this way, they are a kind of 
electronically instantiated super programming language. But, for the reason 
Dreyfus gives in the last sentence of his latest introduction, and for the reasons 
that I have suggested follow from the idea of a form of life, we ought not to 
expect them to achieve more than can be achieved by stimulus-response training 
in the foreseeable future. If I am right about the nature of symbol processing 
computers-that they can only really do what we do when we are acting as though 
we had been S-R trained-there is an essential continuity between neural nets 
and the rest of AI. 
8. A simple test for socialisation 
All this is quite easy to test if anyone ever comes to believe they have socialised 
a neural net or other machine. The test does not require that a machine have a 
body, nor that it be able to do more than produce typescript. The test is even 
simpler than that devised by Turing. The new test requires an uncharitable judge, 
an intelligent and literate control who shares the broad cultural background of the 
judge, and the machine with which the control is to be compared. The judge 
provides both Control and Machine with copies of a few typed paragraphs (in a 
clear, machine-readable font), of somewhat mis-spelled and otherwise mucked- 
about English, which neither has seen before. It is important that the paragraphs 
are previously unseen for it is easy to devise a program to transliterate an example 
once it has been thought through. Once presented, Control and Machine have, 
say, an hour to transliterate the passages into normal English. Machine will have 
the text presented to its scanner and its output will be a second text. Control will 
type his/her transliteration into a word processor to be printed out by the same 
printer as is used by Machine. The judge will then be given the printed texts and 
will have to work out which has been transliterated by Control and which by 
Machine. Here is a specimen of the sort of paragraph the judge would present. 
Mary: The next thing I want you to do is spell a word that means a religious 
ceremony. 
John: You mean rite. Do you want me to spell it out loud? 
Mary: No, I want you to write it. 
John: I’m tired. All you ever want me to do is write, write, write. 
Mary: That’s unfair, I just want you to write, write, write. 
John: OK, 1’11 write, write. 
Mary: Write. 
The point of this simplified test is that the hard thing for a machine to do in a 
Turing Test is to demonstrate the skill of repairing typed English conversation- 
the interactional stuff is mostly icing on the cake [3,4]. The test is designed to 
draw on all the culture-bound common-sense needed to navigate the domain of 
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error correction in printed English. This is the only kind of skill that can be tested 
through the medium of the typed work but it is quite sufficient, if the test is 
carefully designed, to enable us to tell the socialized from the unsocialized. (It is 
worth noting for the combinatorily inclined that a look-up table exhaustively 
listing all corrected passages of about the above length-300 characters-includ- 
ing those for which the most appropriate response would be “I can’t correct that”, 
would contain 106” entries, compared to the, roughly, 1O125 particles in the 
universe. The number of potentially correctible passages would be very much 
smaller of course but, I would guess, would still be beyond the bounds of brute 
strength methods. Note also that the correct response-of which there may be 
more than one-may vary from place to place and time to time as our linguistic 
culture changes.) 
That we have the ability to repair printed English is not a result of our fixed 
store of knowledge or a prolonged period of “training”. And it is not even that 
we are corrected when we go wrong at each newly encountered example of a 
problem. It cannot be this, because the new instances are equally new to any 
potential trainer and we merely beg the question of how the trainer knows the 
correct answer. In this kind of case, we cope with newly encountered problems 
first time and mostly without mistakes. It seems to me that if a machine, neural 
net or otherwise, could pass a carefully designed version of this little test, all the 
significant problems of artificial intelligence would have been solved-the rest 
would be research and development. 
9. Final remarks 
On my account, Dreyfus’ book contains some deep faults and some digressions 
which detract from the main arguments. Nevertheless, more than 20 years on 
from its first publication, What Computers Can’t Do still represents a major 
achievement and is essential reading for those who want to understand the 
principle philosophical objections to the idea of artificial intelligence. I have tried 
to show that in spite of Dreyfus’ achievements, there is more work to be done if 
we are to understand our relationship with machines. Dreyfus explains many of 
the reasons why machines fail; now we have to understand why and how they 
succeed. If we understand how much is done by humans in successful human- 
machine interactions we will see that in the short term, success in the design of 
intelligent machines can be gained with conceptually simple designs that relieve us 
of only parts of the job. Identifying those parts is a complicated matter; the 
answer, difficult enough to extract in a fixed environment, varies from context to 
context and epoch to epoch. In the longer term, the question of the ability of 
machines to replicate more and more of our abilities comes down to socialisabili- 
ty. It seems to me that we have not taken even the first step in mechanising 
socialisibility. But, that this claim can be made without universal derision is, in 
part, the result of the many years of courageous experimentation that make up 
the history of artificial intelligence. 
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